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During the spring and early summer of 2001 there were a series of violent disturbances in various
cities and towns in England (e.g. Oldham, Leeds, Burnley, Bradford), involving young British
Asian men, young British White men and the police. As a consequence, a number of local and
national enquiries were formed to investigate the causes of these disturbances. Though a range of
potential explanations were proposed, two received considerable attention in political circles and
also in the media. First, the lack of a shared civic identity to bring together diverse communities.
Second, increasing segregation of communities on economic, geographic, racial and cultural lines.
The attention paid to these two factors is relatively novel in the UK and represents a departure
from the long-standing debate in the UK which has tended to emphasize racial discrimination as
the key force in driving ethnic disadvantage (CRE, 2002). The debate in the US, at both a policy
and academic level, on these types of issues is of longer standing. One theme that has emerged
f r o mt h ea c a d e m i cl i t e r a t u r ei st h a ts o m ei n d i v i duals in ethnic groups may “choose” to adopt what
are termed “oppositional” identities.1 Where a community or group is socially excluded from a
dominant group, some individuals of that group may identify with the dominant culture and others
may reject that culture.2 This may occur even if the latter groups preferences involve a lower
economic return. From the standpoint of those who choose not to take a rejectionist stance the
rejectionists are making poor economic decisions; they are engaging in self-destructive behaviour.
Such preferences may stem from a lack of economic opportunity, discrimination or it may stem
from a desire to display greater racial or religious solidarity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Selod and
Zenou, 2006).3
In the economics literature there is little direct evidence on what drives such behaviour and
on the implications of such behaviour for labour market outcomes. Blackaby et al. (1997) for the
UK have argued that the labour market disadvantage of ethnic groups may stem from what they
describe as “the cultural outlook of the minority group itself”. They go further and argue that
some groups may have “a taste for isolation” which limits their economic opportunities and raises
their unemployment rates. The authors do not, however, conduct any formal empirical analysis to
gauge the importance of these eﬀects. Similarly Berthoud (2000) acknowledges the importance of
1Our use of the term ethnic refers to non-white identities, although we acknowledge that whites also have an
ethnicity.
2An alternative explanation revolves around qualiﬁcations: skilled minorities could beneﬁt more from integration
than unskilled minorities (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997).
3The diﬃculties in negotiating two cultures has long been a theme in the arts. Recent explorations include the
motion pictures “East is East”, “Bend It Like Beckham”, “Ae Fond Kiss” and “My Son the Fanatic” and within
literature Hai (2008).
2identity- related factors in his discussion of the alienation of certain groups, which he argues is a
consequence and a reinforcing cause of their exclusion from employment. Brown (2000) makes a
similar argument when he argues that quantitative work has been constrained by a general failure
to collect “cultural” information. There is a tendency then to use ethnic group membership as a
catch-all measure for cultural diﬀerences.
This paper undertakes a simple empirical investigation of the relationship between ethnic iden-
tity and employment in the labour market. We have at our disposal a unique data set for Britain,
which deliberately over-samples ethnic groups and contains extensive information on various issues
surrounding ethnic identity and preferences. This allows us to say something on the factors that
might lead some to adopt or possess an oppositional identity and ascertain whether such preferences
are associated with an employment penalty. Our results indicate that the social environment of
individuals has an inﬂuence on their identity choice and that those non-whites who have preferences
that accord with being oppositional are likely to experience an employment penalty.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. In the next section, we summarise
the existing literature in this area. In section 3, our data set is described and we provide some
descriptive statistics. Section 4 deals with the measurement of ethnic preferences. Section 5 presents
the empirical results. The ﬁnal section oﬀers a summary and discussion.
2 A Summary of the Literature
What is ethnic identity? According to Akerlof and Kranton (2000), identity is a person’s sense of
self or self image and “his or her identity is bound to social categories; and individuals identify with
people in some categories and diﬀerentiate themselves from those in others.” (page 720). In other
words, identity is associated with the social environment and expected respective behaviours (a
prescription or norm for behaviour). Deviations from the prescription generate disutility. Examples
of social categories include racial and ethnic designations and ethnic identity is then the extent to
which members of a particular ethnic group associate themselves with their ethnic background or
culture.
The extent to which this occurs is personal and can be based on a whole host of connected
factors including geography and the neighborhood in which individuals live, family background
and peer pressure, time of arrival in a country, language and a desire to socially interact in one’s
own language, the level of human capital, a lack of economic opportunity, discrimination and
expectations of unfavorable treatment and rejection by whites, prejudice against whites, and a
desire to share culture, display greater racial or religious solidarity and improve access to ‘ethnic
goods’ such as food, education or religious services (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Ihlanfeldt and
3Scaﬁdi, 2002).
Few theoretical models have investigated what drives ethnic preferences and the link between
ethnic preferences and outcomes. Akerlof (1997) argues, supported via evidence from sociology
and anthropology, that concerns for status and conformity are key drivers of individual outcomes
including educational attainment, law breaking behaviour and childbearing. Akerlof and Kranton
(2002) propose a theory in which a student’s primary motivation is his or her identity (i.e. students,
have to choose their social categories and eﬀort in school), students have an interest to minimise
the distance between themselves, their “proper” characteristics and actions and the self-image
associated to the speciﬁc category and the quality of a school depends on how students ﬁti n
a school’s social setting. Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) model peer pressures in education by
putting forward the tension faced by individuals between signalling their type to the outside labour
market and signalling their type to their peers: signals that induce high wages can be signals that
induce peer rejection. One of their main results is to show that the more individuals discount the
future, the more acute peer pressure becomes and the more homogenous groups are (in terms of
education).4
Bisin et al. (2008a) construct a model of ethnic identity formation focusing on how choice of
identity is aﬀected by cultural transmission and socialization within the family, peer eﬀects and
social interactions. Battu et al. (2007) develop a model which has some of these features. Here non-
white individuals are deﬁned with respect to their social environment (family, friends, neighbors)
and their attachments to their culture of origin (religion, language). Jobs are mainly found through
social networks.5 Non-whites must decide to totally or partially adopt the white’s culture or to
reject it by anticipating the implications of this choice on their labour market outcomes. Interacting
with whites is beneﬁcial since non-white workers may beneﬁt from the high quality of whites’ social
networks since the latter do not face discrimination. There is an externality of being “close” to
whites. This externality causes the employment rate of non-whites to be positively aﬀected by the
employment rate of whites. However, depending on the willingness to interact with whites or to
4Other related literatures emphasise the importance of English language ﬂuency (Chiswick, 1978; McManus et al.
1983; Borjas, 1994; Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003) and religion and culture (Iannaccone, 1998; Lazear, 1999; Brown,
2000) for the degree of assimilation and labor market outcomes of immigrants. Lazear (1999) focuses on cultural
diﬀerences (religion is obviously part of the culture of people) between the minority and the majority group and
shows that individuals from minority groups are more likely to adopt the culture of the majority when the minority
group accounts for a small proportion of the total population.
5Other studies have also emphaised social networks. In particular, when the unemployment rate is high among a
particular group, individuals of that group have few connections that can refer them to jobs and their social network
is poor (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2005; Montgomery, 1991; Topa, 2001;
Ioannides and Loury, 2004; Zenou, 2009).
4adopt the white’s culture, non-whites can beneﬁt more or less from whites’ connections to jobs.
They ﬁnd that totally identical individuals can end up with totally diﬀerent choices. Some non-
whites will totally reject the white’s culture even though they know that it will sharply decrease
their chance of being employed. This is partly because information about jobs can only be acquired
through social networks (employed friends). In this respect, oppositionalists do not want to interact
with whites and “pay” in some sense the price of this behaviour by experiencing high unemployment
rates and a low probability to ﬁnd a job compared to the other non-whites that are more willing
to adopt the white’s norm.
There are a small number of empirical studies examining the connections between identity and
outcomes and most of this research tends to be in the ﬁeld of education and focuses on the academic
achievement of African American youths. Here it is argued that African American students in poor
areas may be ambivalent about learning standard English, where this may be regarded as “acting
white” and adopting mainstream identities (Ogbu, 1978; Fordham and Ogbu, 1986; Delpit, 1995;
Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey, 1998; Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005). When the distance to the
white community increases, utility increases, reﬂecting the disutility of interracial contacts with
white “neighbors”. This is the case because some non-whites may not “trust” people from other
communities, especially whites, especially when they have been historically discriminated against
(see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002, for an interesting study on trust and racial mixing). What
matters is to “ﬁt in” and not to disappoint your peers. Oth e r w i s ey o ua r ep i l l o r i e d .H o w e v e r ,
much of the quantitative research suggests that “acting white” is a myth (Ainsworth-Darnell and
Downey, 1998 and Cook and Ludwig, 1998 ) although a more recent study by Fryer and Torelli
(2005) ﬁnds some support.6
A very small number of studies gauge the labour market consequences. Pendakur and Pendakur
(2005), using data from Canada, examine the eﬀects of ethnic identity on the use of informal
networks to obtain jobs and on employment itself. They ﬁnd that for European ethnic minorities
the strength of minority identity is positively related to the use of informal methods (friends and
family) for gaining employment but there is no eﬀect for “visible” ethnic minorities (those of non-
European and non-Aboriginal origin). For “visible minorities”, ethnic identity is also associated
with lower occupational prestige and this ﬁnding is not evident for white minorities. Mason (2004)
focuses on the consequences of identiﬁcation to the majority culture and skin color of Hispanic
Americans for labour market outcomes. For Hispanic groups, adopting a non-Hispanic white
racial identity is associated with higher annual income and hourly wages. However, this is not
suﬃcient to overcome the negative penalties associated with a dark complexion or a non-European
6Patacchini and Zenou (2006) also examine this relationship.
5phenotype. Bisin et al. (2008b) ﬁnds that the main determinants for ethnic identity in the UK,
especially for Muslims, are experiences of racial harassment, language spoken at home and with
friends, quality of housing and family structure. They do not, however, examine the labour market
consequences of identity formation.
A couple of recent empirical studies have argued for a broader conceptualisation of identity. Con-
stant and Zimmerman (2008) study the ethnic self-identiﬁcation of migrants in Germany alongside
their identiﬁcation with the German majority culture. They construct a measure of ethnic identity
using information on language, culture, societal interaction, history of migration, and ethnic self-
identiﬁcation. They use this to classify migrants into four groups: integration (identify with both
cultures), assimilation (identify with host and not origin), separation (identify with origin and not
host) and marginalization (identify with neither host or origin). Their results indicate that both
integrated and assimilated men have a higher probability of working and increased earnings whilst
separated and marginalized men have lower employment probabilities and lower earnings compared
to assimilated men
Nekby and Rödin (2007) examines identity formation and the consequences of identity forma-
tion for labour market outcomes for a cohort of students with immigrant backgrounds in Sweden.
Identity strength is measured via the strength of identity to the (ethnic) minority and to the
(Swedish) majority culture. Their results indicate that what matters for incomes and employment
is the strength of identiﬁcation with the majority culture irrespective of the strength of ethnic
minority identity. Nevertheless, males with a strong sense of their ethnic identity but at the same
time a weak tie to the majority culture (the separated) are found to have a lower probability of
employment compared to the assimilated (adherence to majority culture and weak ties to own
culture). The direction of causality is though unclear. Does a strong host country identity increase
the probability of employment or does success in the labour market increase identiﬁcation with
the host country?
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data we employ is derived from the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM)
collected in 1993/94 by the Policy Studies Institute. This includes a standard set of variables cap-
turing individual, demographic and job characteristics (see Modood et al., 1997 for details). It has
the advantage that it over-samples ethnic minority groups and explicitly acknowledges the hetero-
geneity within the non-white population where the ethnic population is composed of six groups
(Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani, African-Asian, Bangladeshi, and Chinese).7 At the heart of the
7For historical reasons Black Africans were not included. Furthermore, the survey only covers England and Wales.
6data set is the 1991 Census. This was used to select the sample of ethnic minorities included in
the survey. In particular, all electoral wards in England and Wales were divided into three bands
(high, medium and low) according to the proportion of the population who were members of ethnic
minorities.8 Within each band a sample of wards was chosen and within each of these selected
wards a sample of addresses was picked. Interviewers then visited 130,000 addresses to identify
any members of the target minority groups living there who could then be interviewed. At each
household containing adults from ethnic groups, one or two were selected for interview. Where a
household had more than two eligible adults, two were chosen at random. Two questionnaires were
randomly assigned to the two adults selected. Though both questionnaires had the same core set
of questions they did contain a diﬀerent set of secondary questions. Importantly, a majority of
selected individuals were interviewed by a member of their own ethnic group either in English or
in their own language, thereby maximizing the response rate and reducing any potential source of
bias. Interviews were successfully obtained in 3291 ethnic households with 5196 ethnic individuals.
A comparison sample containing white households was also obtained generating 2867 white inter-
views.9 Means and standard deviations for a range of variables for the ethnic sample are given in
Table 1.
[Insert Table 1]
The dataset is unique in that it contains extensive information on various aspects of an individ-
ual’s ethnic identity and preferences.10 In particular, we can place individuals in social space via a
number of questions on identiﬁcation with Britishness, identiﬁcation with their own ethnic group,
attitudes towards inter-marriage and preferences in terms of the ethnic makeup of their own child’s
school. There are though a number of caveats in interpreting cultural information There is the
usual issue of the reliability of individual responses and also how responses to diﬀerent questions
may consign the same individual on quite diﬀerent positions in social space relative to whites. Dif-
ferent questions may also indicate the possession of plural identities whereby individuals belong to
more than one group or community. An individuals ethnic background may simply be one of the
many identities that individuals have where diﬀerent identities may be invoked in particular con-
texts. Identities in a sense can be chosen even when the choices are constrained and the constraints
vary in strength depending on the circumstances (Sen, 2000). Furthermore, some questions may
8Electoral wards have been described as the geographic building blocks of the UK. There are 9,527 wards in
England and Wales.
9The response rates were 61% for Caribbeans, 74% for Indians and African Asians, 73% for Pakistanis, 83% for
Bangladeshis, 66% for Chinese and 71% for Whites.
10Though the survey dates back to 1984, the data is the best available in terms of containing extensive information
on ethnic identity preferences. The nearest equivalent is the UK Longitudinal Study, Understanding Society,b u tt h a t
will only be released during 2010.
7not be wholly reliable in terms of locating an individual in social space. For example, it is debatable
whether information on the importance of religion to ones life and also whether an individual wears
ethnic or religious clothing can tell us about the degree of opposition to mainstream values (i.e.
the wearing of a turban by a Sikh does not necessarily equate with being oppositional).
I nt h eF N S E Mt h ei m p o r t a n c eo fe t h n i ci d e n t i ﬁcation was captured by reading out two state-
ments to interviewees: 1. In many ways, I think of myself as being British. 2. In many ways, I
think of myself as [respondent’s ethnic group]. Respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed
and if so, whether strongly or just a little. Table 2 and 3 summarize the responses across diﬀerent
ethnic groups. Both questions are essentially asking about identiﬁcation with a country, with a
place and its way of living and the responses do reveal the diﬃculty in clearly assigning our ethnic
groups to diﬀerent locations within social space.11 Leaving aside the Chinese for a moment, it is
clear that just over 55% of the remaining ethnic groups agreed that they thought of themselves as
British. The group that agreed the most are the African-Asians (71%) and the group that agreed
the least are the Bangladeshis (56%). The Caribbeans are the most likely to disagree (34%). Other
evidence from this data set and not presented here reveals that around a quarter of British-born
Caribbeans did not think of themselves as being British. This contrasts with the West Indian
migrants of the 1940s and 1950s who by most accounts thought of themselves as British and often
talked of coming to “the mother country” (Modood et al. 1997). The Chinese in Table 1 stand out
since roughly equal percentages agreed and disagreed with the notion of being British (44 and 41%
respectively). At least in terms of this question the Chinese seem to sit at both extremes in terms
of their location in social space.
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here]
Table 3 conﬁrms that there is a strong sense of ethnic identity amongst minority groups. Over
80% of each group either agreed strongly or agreed that they thought of themselves in terms of
their own ethnic group. The ﬁgures for those who disagreed are quite small - the highest is for
Caribbeans with around 10% of them not thinking of themselves as Caribbean. Therefore, whilst
as i g n i ﬁcant minority disagree with the notion of being British, this is not the case when it comes
to their own ethnic identity. Furthermore, the answers to the two questions reveal that there may
not be a conﬂict in identities. For example, being British and being Bangladeshi does not compete
in the minds of most respondents, suggesting that identities can indeed be multiple (Sen, 2000).
Table 4 provides some data on another dimension of identity, namely marriage and in particular
attitudes to inter-marriage. Inter-marriage is considered to be a measure of social assimilation
and also a factor producing it (Pagnini and Morgan, 1990). On the other hand some ethnic and
11Note that it does not follow that a failure to feel British equates with antagonism towards whites.
8religious groups regard inter-ethnic marriage as a potential threat endangering and undermining
ethnic identities. In the FNSEM individuals were asked “If a close relative were to marry a white
person would you not mind, would you mind a little, would you mind very much?” Here signiﬁcant
percentages of the three South-Asian groups said they would mind very much with the greatest
hostility being among the Pakistani population (37% of them say they would mind very much a
mixed marriage). A majority of the other groups said that they would not mind and amongst
Caribbeans (8%), African Asians (13%) and the Chinese (7%) the percentages that would mind
very much are quite small.12
[Insert Table 4 here]
T a b l e s5a n d6r e l a t et oa ni m p o r t a n ta r e ao fc o n t r o v e r s yi nb o t ht h eU Ka n dU S ;t h er o l eo f
schools in keeping diﬀerent ethnic communities separate from one another. In one UK report it
was argued that schools dominated by one race or faith should oﬀer at least a quarter of their places
to pupils from other backgrounds (Building Cohesive Communities, 2001). On the other hand, the
UK government is committed to the expansion of church and faith-sponsored schools. A number
of questions were asked in the FNSEM to assess the relevance of ethnicity in inﬂuencing the kind
of school that people wanted for their children. First, how important is ethnicity in choosing a
school (Table 5)? Second, what proportion of one’s ethnic group would you like in your children’s
school (Table 6)? In Table 5 the most common answer is that it would have no inﬂuence. In fact,
it was deemed an important consideration for only a quarter of African-Asians and Indians and for
around one third of Caribbean’s and Bangladeshis. Only one in ten Chinese thought it important.
Table 6 gives some data on the preferred proportion of one’s ethnic group in a school. Of those who
did have a preference 40% of Caribbeans and 38% of Pakistanis wanted a school with 50% or more
from their own ethnic group. For the African Asians, Indian, Bangladeshi and Chinese groups the
ﬁgures are much smaller (24%, 22%, 29% and 11% respectively).
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here]
4 Measurement and Estimation
Our empirical strategy is in two stages. First, by focusing on our ethnic groups, we will try to
decipher the types of factors that are connected to the strength of identity for non-whites. Second,
12Hostility to inter-marriage may not always be a signal of an oppositional identity. For example, if one believes
in assimilation but also believe that society is prejudiced against inter-racial partnerships (or the children of such
partnerships) one may be hostile to a close relative marrying outwith ones own community but still in favour of
mainstream culture.
9we will try and gauge the relationship between identity strength and the probability of being
employed.
The strength of identity is captured in two ways where these form our dependent variables
in a set of probit estimations. First, a binary dependent variable for each of our identity related
questions discussed in the previous section. In particular, the extreme values of each of the variables
are coded one and are taken to encapsulate an oppositional identity and all other responses are
coded zero. For example, if an individual strongly disagrees with inter-marriage that is coded one
and zero if not (Smind). Full details of the identity variables are given in Table 7. Second, we take
the responses from the four variables in Table 7 (Nbrit, Oethnic, Smind and Schcon) and aggregate
them. If an individual gives an extreme response for at least two of the four questions, then he/she
is considered as oppositional and the aggregate variable is coded one and zero otherwise (Opid).
On this basis, less than 10% (8.67%) of individuals in the sample are deemed oppositional.
[Insert Table 7 here]
We also need variables that deﬁne the social environment of each individual and his or her attach-
ment to their culture of origin. Language, or more exactly ﬂuency in English captures some aspects
of the social environment and clearly a lack of English language ﬂuency reduces the probability of
contacts with whites. Similar arguments hold for place of birth and years since arrival in the UK;
being born and raised abroad obviously implies that individuals have had fewer contacts with the
majority population. We thus construct a dummy capturing language ﬂuency (Fluent), a born in
the UK dummy (UKborn), and a variable that indicate the number of years since arrival in the
UK (Yrsmg). We have also two dummy variables concerning marriage: married to someone from
own ethnic group (Marown) and married to someone from another ethnic group (Intmar). Being
married to someone from another ethnic group may indicate greater assimilation and be seen as a
step up the white social ladder. Finally, since neighbors do impact on identity choices, we construct
a dummy variable that indicates if the individual resides in an area where more than 33% of people
of the same ethnic group live (Oethcon). In particular, some minorities may choose to live within
their communities in order to gain access to ethnic shops, places of worship, display greater racial
or religious solidarity or in order to socially interact in ones own language. Residence in ethnic
enclaves potentially reduces contacts with whites.
To gauge the eﬀe c t su p o ne m p l o y m e n t ,w ee s t i m a t eas e to f employment equations using probit
estimation. Employment is coded unity and zero otherwise using the ILO deﬁnition. We do not
examine the eﬀects on earnings, since the response rate for earnings in the FNSEM was poor
especially for the South Asian groups. In any case, it could be argued that the most important
dimension of economic disadvantage is employment and not earnings. According to Blackaby et
10al. (1997), “the lack of jobs is a major factor of the discriminatory process and may ultimately be
more socially damaging”.
One obvious problem here is that the strength of an individual’s identity may in fact be endoge-
nous.13 A lack of success in the labour market may induce or encourage some to adopt identities
that are out of kilter with mainstream or “majority” values. Dealing with this issue especially in a
cross-sectional context is diﬃcult. One standard approach is to undertake at w o - s t a g ei n s t r u m e n t a l
variable estimation,w h e r ei nt h eﬁrst stage we estimate a set of identity probit equations with
appropriate instruments. In the second stage, we insert the predicted values into the employment
probit. The preference’s equation is identiﬁed with a set of appropriate instruments that capture
the inﬂuence of prior experiences or preferences. The instruments include whether individuals have
experienced racial harassment (Rharra), if their parents made the decision in choosing their wife
or husband (Arrmar) and if they prefer a school of their own religion for their children (Schrelig).
For these to be suitable instruments, they must not aﬀect the probability of being in employment
other than through the eﬀects of these variables on the probability of having an oppositional
identity. Indeed, using a likelihood ratio test, we were able to accept the null hypothesis that
the instruments either individually or jointly do not have a direct impact on the probability of
employment. Furthermore, the instruments must not be determined either by identity choice or
employment outcomes (the instruments must avoid the possibility of reverse causality). This is no
simple task. Take parental inﬂuence on marriage. Being in employment may make it easier for
parents to ﬁnd you a match. On the other hand, being employed by non-ethnic employers may raise
contacts with whites and by raising the chances of procuring a white mate reduces the probability of
an arranged and mono-ethnic marriage. In terms of single faith schools the act of a parent selecting
one’s partner is clearly beyond the individuals control. However, the act of accepting a parent’s
choice is not. And those individuals whose acceptance of parental authority and traditional values
extend this far may well be less employable. One then needs to take care in interpreting our results
and perhaps cautious in making strong claims of causality. The results that we report, be they two
stage instrumental estimation or otherwise are simply an indication of the relationship between
identity choices and employment but by no means the ﬁnal word.
Throughout our estimations the sample utilized is the working age population of males (aged
16 to 64) and females (aged 16-59). Given their very small numbers in the dataset the Chinese are
excluded from the analysis and the Bangladeshi and Pakistani group are combined on the basis
that they are both overwhelmingly Muslim, they face similar levels of relative disadvantage in the
labour market (Blackaby et al. 1999) and they emanate from rural areas in their origin country.
13Using the Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity (Smith and Blundell, 1986) we found that three of our identity
measures were endogenous (Nbrit, Smind and Schcon).
11All results reported are marginal eﬀects.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Identity formation
The results in Table 8 focus on the correlation between identity and other factors. Separate esti-
mations are undertaken for each of the identity terms and the aggregate identity variable (Opid).
All three instruments behave as expected and are jointly statistically signiﬁcant at all conventional
levels of signiﬁcance (see likelihood ratio tests at bottom of Table 8). Whilst having experienced
racial harassment (Rharra) leads individuals belonging to an ethnic group to strongly reject British
culture and all that is associated with it (interracial marriage, school mixing, etc.), it does not seem
to strengthen their sense of belonging to their own ethnic group (Rharra has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on all identity variables but Oethnic). On the other hand, those who prefer a school of their own
religion (Schrelig) are consistently more likely to be oppositional across all ﬁve estimations. Having
experienced an arranged marriage (Arrmar) is positively related to an oppositional stance in three
cases (Nbrit, Smind and Opid) with the strongest eﬀect being evident for Smind: those who have
had an arranged marriage are more likely to strongly mind inter-marriages.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Attachments to the culture of origin (language, religion,) and social environment (family, friends,
neighbors) are key factors here. In Table 8, it is easy to see that language ﬂuency and identity
are connected. In particular, we ﬁnd that being ﬂuent in English indicates less of an oppositional
identity in four out of ﬁve identity regressions. Language ﬂuency tends to be associated with
“mainstream” values. The two other variables that are closely related to language ﬂuency (UK
born and years since arrival in the UK) are also signiﬁcant and with the expected signs. Being
UK born is associated with a less oppositional stance for three of the identity variables (Nbrit,
Oethnic and Opid). As one would expect the longer an individual has been in the UK (Yrsmg), the
less hostile they are to being British (Nbrit) and the less they emphasize their own ethnic group
(Oethnic). The ethnic enclave’s variable (Oethcon) is also signiﬁcant and has the expected sign. In
particular, living in a high ethnic concentration area (over a third of the population in your area is
from your own ethnic group) makes it more likely that individuals will strongly disagree with being
British (Nbrit) and raises the probability that individuals strongly align themselves with their own
ethnic group (Oethnic). Being married to someone from another ethnic group (Intmar) suggests
that individuals choose to adopt the white’s norm and, in particular, to strongly agree with being
British.
12The dummies for ethnic groups reveal that the African-Asians are the least oppositional relative
to the omitted category of Indians. They are less likely to strongly disagree with being British,
are less likely to align themselves strongly with their own ethnic group and are less likely to
strongly disagree with inter-marriages. The other groups are more diﬃcult to characterize in
this manner. The Bangladeshi/Pakistani ethnic group display oppositional identities on only one
dimension (Schcon) and the Caribbean group displays oppositional identities on just two dimensions
(Nbrit and Schcon). The ﬁnding that Caribbeans are less likely to see themselves as British (the
coeﬃcient on Nbrit is positive and statistically signiﬁcant) contrasts with the many Caribbeans
who migrated to the UK in the 1940s and 1950s and who by many accounts did regard themselves
as British and often spoke of coming to the “mother-country” (Modood et al., 1997). In terms of
minding inter-marriages Caribbeans are less likely to be hostile. This is unsurprising since half of
the live in partners of British born Caribbean men were white females (Modood et al., 1997). Being
m a r r i e dt oaw h i t ef e m a l em a yt h e nb ea ni n d i c a t o ro fa s s i m i l a t i o na n dc o u l db es e e na sas t e p
up the white social ladder and so be related to career aspirations (Berthoud, 2000, and Meng and
Gregory, 2005). This is supported by our dummy for inter-marriage (Intmar), which is associated
with less hostility to inter-marriages and the notion of being British.
5.2 Identity and the probability of employment
The results from our instrumental variable employment probits are given in Table 9 (second stage).
As stated earlier, the identity terms capture to some extent the willingness of non-whites to interact
with whites. The question then is whether there is a negative externality from not associating with
the majority group in term of a loss in employment. This is indeed what is found but for only
two out of four of the identity terms. Non-whites who strongly disagree with the notion of being
B r i t i s ha r el e s sl i k e l yt ob ee m p l o y e d( b ya r o u n d7 % ) . This compares with a penalty of around 11%
where we do not correct for the endogeneity of identity (not reported here). However, having an
identity that is closely tied to ones ethnic group does not seem to generate an employment penalty
(Oethnic). There is also a cost associated with being very hostile to inter-marriages; those who
strongly disagree with inter-marriages incur an employment probability penalty of around 6.5%.
For our aggregate measure, Opid, we ﬁnd that having an oppositional identity does reduce the
probability of being in employment by around 6%. This compares with 9% where we do not correct
for the endogeneity of ethnic preferences (again not reported here).
[Insert Table 9 here]
Let us now focus on the other variables that inﬂuence the social environment of individuals. There is
evidence of a linguistic advantage for those who are ﬂuent in English in terms of employment. This
13accords with other research that ﬁnds that ethnic group diﬀerences in communication styles have
an important inﬂuence on the labour market success of low-income non-whites in the US (McManus
et al., 1983; Lang, 1986; Cornell and Welch, 1996; Lazear, 1999). The positive relationship between
language ﬂuency and employment perhaps reﬂects improved job search strategies, an ability to
convince potential employers of the value of their qualiﬁcations or the possibility that for certain
jobs (e.g. in the service sector) ﬂuency is an entry requirement (Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003). It is
also found that the longer have non-whites been in the UK, the more likely they are to work. Being
resident in an ethnic enclave only matters in regression (1) where the identity term is Nbrit: here
living in an ethnically concentrated neighborhood reduces the probability of being in employment
and whilst this is consistent with other studies on ethnic enclaves (see, in particular, Edin et al.
2003) our ethnic concentration measure is narrow and potentially endogenous (those with high
oppositional preferences may select into neighborhoods with higher same group concentrations).
Ac l e a rb e n e ﬁt arising from inter-ethnic marriage is evident. In three of the regressions being
married either within ones own group or outside is associated with a higher probability of being in
employment relative to being single (the omitted category) and the eﬀect is larger for those who
marry outwith their own community (20% as opposed to 13-15%). For the ethnic dummies we
ﬁnd that Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, who are both overwhelmingly Muslim, are less likely to be
employed relative to Indians (the omitted category) across all regressions and this eﬀect is strong
at approximately 24%. The coeﬃcients on age, age-squared and children behave as expected and
since there is no discernible eﬀect arising through gender, separate estimates for males and females
are not attempted. The eﬀects of gender on employment may vary across our ethnic groups and
in separate estimations for each ethnic group we did ﬁnd that Black Caribbean males were less
likely to be in employment. The presence of children reduces the probability of employment where
this may stem from the disincentive eﬀects arising through the beneﬁts y s t e mt h a tl i n k sb e n e ﬁts
to family size. There may be diﬀerential eﬀects here across gender. It has been suggested that
one mechanism for overcoming disadvantage is to improve educational qualiﬁcations (Leslie and
Drinkwater, 1999). Though little is happening with respect to foreign qualiﬁcations, possessing a
UK degree does seem to matter. Having a UK degree raises the probability of being employed of
ethnic groups in the UK by up to 25%. The lack of any eﬀect for foreign qualiﬁcations (Fqual)
may reﬂect some doubt amongst native employers about the quality and portability of foreign
qualiﬁcations (Friedberg, 2000).
Strong spatial eﬀects are apparent when examining home (Owner-occupier) and vehicle (Own
car) ownership. Having access to a private vehicle opens up the potential area of job search and
improves the possibility of getting employment (Thomas, 1998; Raphael and Stoll, 2001; Patacchini
and Zenou, 2005). Other evidence reveals that ethnic groups in the UK are more likely to use
14public transport relative to whites with non-whites and Bangladeshis in particular, having the
lowest car ownership (Owen and Green, 2000). The importance of household tenure in predicting
unemployment is well established (Hughes and McCormick, 1987) and owner-occupier rates have
been found to be higher for Indians relative to whites with non-white Caribbeans and Bangladeshis
more likely to be renting from the social landlord sector than the private sector (DETR, 2000).14
We ﬁnd that those individuals who are owner-occupiers and those who own their own car are more
likely to be in employment. The local economic environment may also determine the employment
position of minorities and this is captured via a set of ward level unemployment dummies. However,
there is no evidence that higher local unemployment results in a lower probability of obtaining
employment.15
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The argument that individuals possess or display oppositional identities has been an important
theme in attempting to explain racial diﬀerences in school performance in the US (Ogbu, 1978;
Fordham and Ogbu, 1986; Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey, 1998). However, the relationship be-
tween ethnic identities and the labour market remains relatively unexplored at both a theoretical
and empirical level. In terms of the latter, data availability seems the key constraint. This paper
examines the relationship between ethnic identity and employment in the British labour market
using a dataset which is rich in information on ethnic identity and preferences.
Our ﬁndings do indicate considerable heterogeneity in the non-white population in terms of
preferences. Though the African-Asian ethnic group is found to have less extreme oppositional
preferences, the other groups are much more diﬃcult to characterize in this manner, since there are
diﬀerences depending on how one measures ethnic preferences. Indeed, our results cannot be seen
as ﬁnding strong and widespread oppositional identities. Nevertheless, our empirical ﬁndings do
suggest that extreme ethnic preferences for non-whites are related to whether they were married
to someone outwith their own community, their ﬂuency in the English language and whether they
14Car ownership and housing tenure may of course be endogenous in the employment equation (Blackaby et al.,
1997). Indeed, employment raises income making it easier to purchase a home and/or a private vehicle, and steady
employment in a ﬁxed location may encourage home-ownership relative to other forms of tenure.
15We also used the whole set of responses for each of the four identity variables to construct four ordered oppositional
identity variables and one aggregate ordered oppositional variable and then ran a set of ordered probits. On the whole
the results were slightly weaker but did still point to the importance of being UK born, years since migration, ethnic
enclaves and intermarriage. The instruments were slightly weaker. Where we included in the employment model
the ordered oppositional identity variables we again found that a higher Nbrit and Smind reduces the probability of
being in employment.
15born in and how long they have been resident in the UK. In addition, we ﬁnd that a belief in
single faith schools, an experience of racial harassment and having had an arranged marriage are
all associated with more extreme preferences.
Though one needs to be cautious in this type of analysis, our results do also suggest that there
is an employment penalty associated with extreme identities. Those with extreme preferences
experience a 6 to 7% lower probability of being in employment relative to those with less extreme
views. These eﬀects are evident when we control for the endogeneity of ethnic preferences and a
range of variables capturing assimilation eﬀects. Though the size of these eﬀects is non-trivial, the
eﬀects are smaller than the inﬂuence of other variables such as domestic educational qualiﬁcations,
inter-ethnic marriage and home and car-ownership. On the other hand, the size of the eﬀects are
larger than the eﬀects of other variables which have received much more attention in the literature
on ethnic disadvantage (i.e. language ﬂuency and ethnic enclaves).
As it stands, our results are broadly in line with the very small number of empirical studies in
this area. Nekby and Rödin (2007) and Constant and Zimmerman (2008) for Sweden and Germany
respectively, ﬁnd that “separated” males (identify with origin country and not with host country)
have a lower probability of working relative to those who are assimilated (identify with host country
and not origin country). Similarly, a Canadian study by Pendakur and Pendakur (2004) ﬁnds that
for “visible” minorities ethnic identity is associated with lower job quality. The only study, as far
as we aware, that ﬁnds no eﬀect is by Casey and Dustmann (2009). Using German panel data
they ﬁnd no correlation between ethnic identity and various labour market outcomes including
wages, participation, employment and unemployment. Despite the evidence for an identity eﬀect
on economic outcomes, the research is embryonic and further research is clearly needed on the
relationship between cultural and ethnic identity and success in the labour market. This requires
not only more purpose built data but also more theoretical explorations trying to delineate the
mechanisms through which ethnic identity may impact on economic outcomes and behaviour.
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20Table 1: Means and standard deviations of selected variables 
 
Variable Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Description 
Emp  0.776  0.417  Employment status, 1 if employed 0 otherwise (ILO definition) 
Rharra  0.131  0.338  1 if was racially harassed 
Schrelig  0.167  0.373  1 if prefers own religion school for children 
Arrmar  0.164  0.371  1 if had arranged marriage 
Fluent  0.726  0.446  1 if speaks English fluently 
UKborn  0.332  0.471  1 if born in the UK 
Yrsmg 21.01  9.44  Years  since  migration 
Oethcon  0.053  0.223  1 if living in own ethnic concentration area of 33% or more 
Marown  0.673  0.469  1 if married to someone from own ethnic group 
Intmar  0.053  0.210  1 if married to someone from a different ethnic group 
Unmar 0.274  0.446  1  if  single 
Caribbean  0.296  0.457  1 if of Caribbean origin 
African-Asian  0.159  0.365  1 if of African-Asian origin 
Bangladeshi  0.056  0.229  1 if of Bangladeshi origin 
Pakistani  0.165  0.373  1 if of Pakistani origin 
Indian  0.278  0.428  1 if of Indian origin 
Chinese  0.046  0.265  1 if of Chinese origin 
Age 33.89  11.93  Age  of  respondent 
Male 0.600  0.490  1  if  male 
Child04  0.407  0.491  Presence of children of age less than 5 
Childd511  0.508  0.500  Presence of children between 5 and 11 years old 
Child1215  0.328  0.469  Presence of children between 12 and 15 years old 
Child16ov  0.370  0.483  Presence of children of 16 years or more 
UKdegree  0.118  0.323  1 if has UK higher degree, degree, Diploma or equivalent  
UKalevel  0.149  0.406  1 if has UK A-Level qualification or equivalent 
UKolevel  0.255  0.498  1 if has UK O-Level qualification or equivalent 
NUKqual  0.478  0.500  1 if has no UK qualifications 
Fqual  0.206  0.404  1 if has any foreign qualifications 
North  0.208  0.405  1 if living in north of England 
Midlands  0.287  0.452  1 if living in the Midlands 
South  0.505  0.500  1 if living in South or South East  
Owner-occupier  0.720  0.449  1 if owner occupier 
Own car  0.754  0.431  1 if owns a car 
Un04  0.082  0.274  Ward unemployment rate less than 5% 
Un59  0.304  0.460  Ward unemployment rate between 5 &9% 
Un1014  0.229  0.420  Ward unemployment rate between 10 &14% 
Un1519  0.143  0.350  Ward unemployment rate between 15 &19% 
Un20m  0.242  0.428  Ward unemployment rate of 20% or more 
      
 
   
Table 2: In many ways I think of myself as British (%) 
 
 Caribbean  Indian  African 
Asian 
Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese 
Strongly  agree  20.09  13.98 25.79  22.53  14.23 10.00 
Agree  37.77  43.69 45.28  37.55  41.90 38.00 
Neither  8.30  13.40 10.69  16.21  20.55 11.00 
Disagree  24.02  23.30 16.04  15.22  18.58 33.00 
Strongly  disagree  9.83  5.63 2.20  8.50  4.74 8.00 
N  458  515 318  506  253 100 
 
Table 3: In many ways I think of myself as ….[Respondent’s ethnic group] (%) 
 
 Caribbean  Indian  African 
Asian 
Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese 
Strongly agree  49.89  39.81  43.71  44.36  49.61  53.00 
Agree 34.06  47.57  42.14  41.78  44.09  40.00 
Neither 6.50  7.18  8.80  9.70  2.75  1.00 
Disagree 7.59  4.85  4.72  2.57  3.15  4.00 
Strongly disagree  1.95  0.58  0.63  1.58  0.39  2.00 
N 461  515  318  505  254  100 
 
 
Table 4: If a close relative were to marry a white person (%) 
 
 Caribbean  Indian  African 
Asian 
Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese 
Would not mind  82.43  51.87  66.25  38.61  49.60  84.69 
Mind a little  6.51  10.02  11.04  11.09  9.20  6.12 
Mind very much  8.24  27.89  13.56  36.83  33.20  7.14 
Can’t say  2.82  10.22  9.15 13.47  8.00 2.05 
N 461  509  317  505  250  98 
 
Table 5: How important is ethnicity in choosing a school? (%) 
 
 Caribbean  Indian  African 
Asian 
Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese 
Very  important  15.94  6.81 8.44    12.06  16.21 3.03 
Fairly important  20.74  16.15  15.31  16.60  18.58  7.07 
Not very important  16.16  13.42  10.31  15.02  16.21  15.15 
No  influence  44.32  57.78 59.06  47.23  38.34 73.74 
Can’t  say  2.84  5.84 6.88  9.09  10.67 1.01 
N 458  514  320  506  253  99 
 
Table 6: What proportion of one’s ethnic group would you like in your children’s school? (%) 
 
 Caribbean  Indian  African 
Asian 
Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese 
Fewer  than  half  16.67  11.07 14.42  9.49  14.17 23.23 
About half  35.06  18.83  20.06  28.06  30.31  7.07 
More  than  half  4.11  1.55 1.57  5.14  5.12 1.01 
No  preference  40.69  63.11 56.11  48.62  40.94 68.69 
Can’t say  3.46  5.44  7.84 8.70  9.45  0.00 




Table 7: Oppositional identity variables 
 
Variable Description  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Nbrit  1 if strongly disagree that in many ways I think of myself 
as British, 0 if neither agree or disagree, agree, disagree, 
strongly agree and can’t say. 
0.067 0.250 
Oethnic  1 if strongly agree that in many ways I think of myself as 
being of the original ethnic group (e.g. Indian, Pakistani 
etc), 0 if neither agree nor disagree, agree, disagree, 
strongly disagree and can’t say. 
0.456 0.498 
Smind  1 if mind very much if a relative marries a white person, 
0 if does not mind, mind very little and can’t say. 
0.190 0.392 
Schcon  1 if prefers school for children with half or more of the 
pupils being from his or her own ethnic group. 
0.288 0.453 
Opid  1 if extremely oppositional (at least two of nbrit, oethnic, 





















 Table 8: Non-white identities - probit regressions (first stage)  
 Nbrit  Oethnic  Smind  Schcon  Opid 
Rharra  0.046 0.006 0.122 0.060 0.056 
 (2.37)*  (0.12)  (2.46)*  (1.76)+  (1.81)+ 
Schrelig  0.031 0.142 0.217 0.116 0.115 
  (2.28)*  (3.50)** (5.74)** (3.22)** (5.28)** 
Arrmar  0.045 0.004 0.155 0.046 0.052 
  (2.93)** (0.10) (4.49)** (1.27)  (2.53)* 
Fluent  -0.026 -0.135 -0.093 -0.009 -0.027 
  (1.82)+  (2.92)**  (2.20)* (0.22) (1.98)* 
UKborn  -0.048 -0.355 -0.084 -0.103 -0.084 
 (3.30)**  (4.80)**  (1.16)  (1.57)  (3.30)** 
Yrsmg  -0.003 -0.007 -0.012 -0.021 -0.003 
 (4.02)**  (2.72)**  (0.09)  (0.67)  (2.21)* 
Oethcon  0.041 0.128 0.039 0.014 0.027 
 (2.44)*  (2.36)*  (0.87)  (0.30)  (1.11) 
Marown  -0.010 -0.054 -0.075 -0.006 -0.020 
  (0.58) (0.94) (1.41) (0.11) (0.70) 
Intmar  -0.036 -0.067 -0.253 -0.097 -0.084 
  (1.79)+  (0.76) (3.63)** (1.30)  (2.31)* 
Caribbean  0.098 0.061 -0.224 0.177 0.001 
  (2.70)** (0.98) (4.60)**  (2.98)** (0.02) 
African-Asian  -0.044 -0.094 -0.145 0.060 -0.049 
 (2.02)*  (1.78)+  (3.33)**  (1.15)  (1.97)* 
Bangladeshi/Pakistani  -0.004 -0.000 -0.074 0.102  0.003 
 (0.33)  (0.01)  (1.96)+  (2.49)*  (0.16) 
Age  -0.000 0.013 -0.010 -0.007 -0.011 
  (0.08) (0.93) (0.76) (0.54)  (1.65)+ 
Age2/100  0.002 -0.009 0.015 0.005 0.014 
  (0.27) (0.53) (1.05) (0.36)  (1.76)+ 
Male  -0.017 -0.027 -0.021 0.025 -0.012 
  (1.43) (0.73) (0.63) (0.78) (0.61) 
Child04 -0.022  0.005  0.018  0.037  -0.027 
  (1.56) (0.13) (0.51) (1.05) (1.37) 
Child511  0.011 -0.042 0.060 0.004 0.029 
  (0.88)  (1.17) (1.90)+ (0.13) (1.68)+ 
Child1215  0.001 -0.037 0.009 0.030 0.026 
  (0.12) (0.97) (0.27) (0.89) (1.34) 
UKdegree  -0.017 -0.079 -0.097 0.160  0.004 
  (0.92) (1.17) (1.48)  (2.42)*  (0.10) 
UKalevel -0.031  -0.019  0.164  0.016  0.011 
  (1.71)+ (0.30) (2.45)* (0.26)  (0.28) 
UKolevel  -0.025 0.023 -0.001 0.027 -0.032 
  (1.54) (0.41) (0.02) (0.56) (1.19) 
Fqual  0.008 -0.115 -0.061 -0.024 -0.026 
 (0.59)  (2.92)**  (1.80)+  (0.67)  (1.45) 
North  0.030 0.195 0.092 0.013 0.060 
  (1.60)  (3.94)**  (2.02)* (0.29) (2.13)* 
Midlands  0.027 0.048 0.034 0.042 0.036 
  (1.85)+ (1.21)  (0.95)  (1.20) (1.69)+ 
Owner-occupier  -0.036 -0.048 0.005 -0.081 -0.030 
  (2.52)* (1.14)  (0.12) (2.26)* (1.48) 
Own  car  0.020  0.052 -0.003 -0.060 -0.006 
  (1.72)+ (1.22)  (0.08) (1.69)+ (0.28) 
Un59  0.008 -0.168 0.182 -0.011 0.011 
  (0.18)  (1.63) (2.26)* (0.10)  (0.14) 
Un1014  0.061 0.100 0.113 0.134 0.057 
  (1.20) (0.95) (1.30) (1.19) (0.66) 
Un1519  0.033 0.184 0.108 0.037 0.012 
  (0.66) (1.73)+ (1.22)  (0.33)  (0.17) 
Un20m  0.034 0.137 0.161 0.122 0.007 
  (0.75)  (1.28) (1.78)+ (1.09)  (0.10) 
Observations 942  1056  1057  1055  991 
Pseudo R
2  0.2044 0.1609 0.1940 0.1665 0.1818 
Unrestricted Log likelihood (ϕ)  -206.27 -686.60 -521.01 -578.69 -280.94 
Wald χ
2(m)  88.66  80.42 212.20 93.50 114.44 
Prob > χ
2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Restricted Log likelihood (θ)  -272.15 -815.04 -630.55 -685.84 -357.62 
LR test χ
2 (3)  131.76 256.88 219.08 214.30 153.36 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Notes: LR  test  χ




 Table 9: Employment - probit regressions (Second Stage)(correcting for endogeneity) 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Nbrit -0.070         
 (1.89)+         
Oethnic   -0.065       
   (1.26)       
Smind     -0.064     
     (2.02)*     
Schcon       -0.049   
       (1.36)   
Opid         -0.058 
         (1.99)* 
Fluent 0.084  0.081  0.077  0.079  0.084 
 (1.67)+  (1.86)+  (2.42)*  (2.40)*  (2.39)* 
UKborn -0.228  -0.234  -0.245  -0.237  -0.223 
 (2.44)*  (1.92)+  (2.17)*  (2.04)*  (2.29)* 
Yrsmg 0.012  0.009  0.007  0.007  0.009 
 (2.73)**  (2.31)*  (2.40)*  (2.33)*  (2.64)** 
Oethcon -0.050  -0.059  -0.072  -0.059  -0.076 
 (1.90)+  (1.57)  (1.12)  (0.92)  (1.19) 
Marown 0.109  0.129  0.147  0.136  0.130 
 (1.14)  (0.96)  (1.94)+  (1.76)+  (1.72)+ 
Intmar 0.170  0.183  0.197  0.196  0.201 
 (1.43)  (1.50)  (1.91)+  (1.79)+  (2.01)* 
Caribbean -0.051  -0.053  -0.061  -0.052  -0.053 
 (0.24)  (0.34)  (1.90)+  (0.36)  (1.31) 
African-Asian 0.010  0.045  0.006  0.082  0.038 
 (0.12)  (0.56)  (0.07)  (1.14)  (0.51) 
Bangladeshi/Pakistani -0.254  -0.266  -0.251  -0.236  -0.254 
 (4.33)**  (4.47)**  (5.33)**  (3.87)**  (4.62)** 
Age 0.066  0.058  0.055  0.050  0.052 
 (3.79)**  (3.41)**  (3.45)**  (3.03)**  (3.30)** 
Age2/100 -0.074  -0.065  -0.062  -0.060  -0.060 
 (3.70)**  (3.25)**  (3.33)**  (3.10)**  (3.20)** 
Male -0.071  -0.063  -0.060  -0.064  -0.059 
 (1.14)  (0.52)  (1.01)  (0.75)  (1.00) 
Child04 -0.000  0.022  0.034  0.034  0.012 
 (0.01)  (0.43)  (0.72)  (0.69)  (0.27) 
Child511 -0.099  -0.112  -0.090  -0.116  -0.098 
 (2.20)*  (2.75)**  (2.05)*  (2.75)**  (2.31)* 
Child1215 -0.107  -0.104  -0.092  -0.098  -0.089 
 (2.25)*  (2.14)*  (2.03)*  (1.61)  (1.98)* 
UKdegree 0.225  0.221  0.234  0.253  0.238 
 (2.67)**  (2.44)*  (2.90)**  (3.24)**  (3.05)** 
UKalevel 0.097  0.090  0.109  0.110  0.097 
 (0.90)  (1.05)  (1.37)  (1.38)  (1.23) 
UKolevel 0.042  0.029  0.026  0.040  0.029 
 (0.51)  (0.42)  (0.40)  (0.62)  (0.29) 
Fqual 0.038  0.002  0.015  0.018  0.020 
 (0.77)  (0.04)  (0.30)  (0.37)  (0.42) 
North 0.111  0.114  0.119  0.113  0.117 
 (2.60)**  (2.16)*  (2.75)**  (2.18)*  (2.69)** 
Midlands 0.117  0.114  0.117  0.114  0.126 
 (2.80)**  (2.43)*  (2.58)**  (2.53)*  (2.73)** 
Owner-occupier 0.128  0.139  0.125  0.141  0.122 
 (2.41)*  (3.07)**  (2.36)*  (3.24)**  (2.51)* 
Own car  0.088  0.081  0.087  0.094  0.079 
 (1.77)+  (1.53)  (1.84)+  (1.97)*  (1.61) 
Un59 -0.055  -0.049  -0.057  -0.052  -0.058 
 (0.74)  (0.22)  (0.34)  (0.74)  (0.69) 
Un1014 -0.041  -0.052  -0.048  -0.031  -0.016 
 (0.23)  (0.29)  (0.28)  (0.18)  (0.10) 
Un1519 -0.059  -0.042  -0.047  -0.055  -0.045 
 (0.34)  (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.46)  (0.27) 
Un20m -0.096  -0.118  -0.114  -0.097  -0.099 
 (0.20)  (0.64)  (0.66)  (0.04)  (0.30) 
Observations 705  706  706  704  703 
Pseudo R
2 0.2103  0.2083  0.2110  0.2065  0.2074 
Log likelihood  -348.03  -349.83  -348.62  -349.40  -348.11 
Wald χ
2(m)  185.39 184.08 186.51  181.89  182.18 
Prob > χ
2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
   
 